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As a discipline, psychology is deﬁned by its location in the ambiguous space between
mind and body, but theories underpinning the application of psychology in psychotherapy
are largely silent on this fundamental metaphysical issue. This is a remarkable state of
affairs, given that psychotherapy is typically a real-time meeting between two embodied
agents, with the goal of facilitating behavior change in one party. The overarching aim
of this paper is to problematize the mind–body relationship in psychotherapy in the
service of encouraging advances in theory and practice. The paper brieﬂy explores various
psychotherapeutic approaches to help explicate relationships between mind and body from
these perspectives. Themes arising from this analysis include a tendency toward dualism
(separation ofmind and body from the conceptualization of human functioning), exclusivism
(elimination of either mind or body from the conceptualization of human functioning), or
mind–body monism (conceptualization of mind and body as a single, holistic system). We
conclude that the literature, as a whole, does not demonstrate consensus, regarding the
relationship between mind and body in psychotherapy.We then introduce a contemporary,
holistic, psychological conceptualization of the relationship between mind and body, and
argue for its potential utility as an organizing framework for psychotherapeutic theory
and practice. The holistic approach we explore, “grounded cognition,” arises from a long
philosophical tradition, is inﬂuential in current cognitive science, and presents a coherent
empirically testable framework integrating subjective and objective perspectives. Finally,
we demonstrate how this “grounded cognition” perspective might lead to advances in the
theory and practice of psychotherapy.
Keywords: embodiment, embodied cognition, psychosocial treatments, psychotherapy, naturalism, phenomenol-
ogy, mind–body, grounded cognition
INTRODUCTION
As a discipline, psychological science is “mounted above the philo-
sophical gap between mind and body” (Tschacher and Haken,
2007, p. 1). The inherent challenges of this position are clearly
seen in psychology’s primary application, psychotherapy (the use
of psychological science to improve mental health and wellbe-
ing). The theoretical foundation of psychopathology (the study of
the nature and treatment of mental disorders) has been described
as akin to that of biology’s before Darwin (Frances and Egger,
1999), and arguably, the elephant in the room is the lack of
consensus, both implicit, and explicit, about the relationship
between mind and body (Kendler, 2008). Whether expressed
as human versus natural sciences, hermeneutic versus positivist
methods, or understanding versus explanation, Cartesian or sub-
stance dualism (mind and body are two types of substance) is yet
to be resolved in psychopathology and psychotherapy. The ﬁeld
is consequently characterized by polarized schools of thought,
identifying it as an immature science in Kuhnian terms (Kuhn,
1962).
In the absence of a consensus position on the mind–body rela-
tionship, psychotherapists juggle tangible and intangible features
of their clients without integrative models (Murray, 2011). It is
noteworthy that international guidelines for psychology training
programs rarely require a competency around this ontological
issue, suggesting that thedisciplinemayhave relegated it to the“too
hard” basket. Contemporary research across multiple disciplines,
however, suggests that the case should be re-opened.
Recent research in philosophy (Clark, 1997; Lakoff and John-
son, 1999), cognitive science (Brooks, 1991; Chemero, 2009) and
psychology itself (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg and Robertson, 1999)
advocates a fundamental reappraisal of the relationship between
mind and body. The “embodied cognition” research program has
many strands, but all commence with a rejection of the dualistic
separation of body and mind (Shapiro, 2011). Here, we propose
grounded cognition as an embodied, psychological framework
which provides a holistic conceptualization of body and mind.
It is our position that articulating the relationship between body
and mind from a psychological perspective will provide a con-
sensus position and an organizing framework for the mind–body
relationship for psychotherapy research and practice. We contend
that this will encourage practitioners to reﬂect on their assump-
tions about cognitions and how they conceptualize body andmind
in treatment, leading to a better understanding of the tensions
between psychotherapy theory and practice and the identiﬁcation
of gaps in existing therapies and consequently an expansion of the
range of therapies offered to the patient.
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The paper is structured in four sections. First, we brieﬂy con-
sider a range of approaches to psychotherapy through the lens
of their apparent assumptions about mind–body. Themes aris-
ing from this analysis include a tendency toward an uncritical
dualism (separation of mind and body from the conceptu-
alization of human functioning), exclusivism (elimination of
either mind or body from the conceptualization of human func-
tioning), or mind–body monism (conceptualization of mind
and body as a single, holistic system) and we conclude that
the psychotherapy literature, as a whole, does not demon-
strate consensus, regarding the relationship between mind
and body. We propose that an organizing framework for
the mind–body relationship, underpinned by a holistic con-
ceptualization of the relationship, would beneﬁt psychother-
apy research and practice. Second, philosophical accounts
which portray a holistic mind–body relationship from phe-
nomenological and objective perspectives are outlined. Third,
we propose that these perspectives are integrated, psycholog-
ically, by “grounded cognition,” constituting a comprehen-
sively articulated, empirically informed, organizing framework
for conceptualization of the mind–body relationship in psy-
chotherapy. In the ﬁnal section we consider how the applica-
tion of psychological science in psychotherapy might advance
through a thoroughgoing consideration of “grounded cogni-
tion.”
MIND–BODY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CURRENT
PSYCHOTHERAPIES
There is no agreed taxonomy of psychological therapies (e.g.,
Kahl et al., 2012; Tschacher et al., 2014), but to achieve an
adequate coverage of existing approaches for the present pur-
poses, we categorise psychotherapies into ﬁve fuzzy-bordered
groups: psychoanalysis, behavioral therapies, cognitive therapies,
mindfulness-based therapies, and body psychotherapies. Each of
these has many branches and extensive literatures – thus, in this
brief review we aim only to explore different ideas regarding the
relationship between mind and body from within each approach,
and across approaches, rather than attempting to assign particu-
lar conceptualizations of the mind–body relationship to particular
approaches.
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Although psychoanalytic theory and practice have fallen out of
favor in contemporary psychological science, aspects of Freud’s
thinking can still be discerned in current psychotherapy (Dowd,
2004). An important aspect of psychoanalytic theory is the
“cognitive unconscious,” or the “unconscious mind.” In oppo-
sition to the popular enlightenment view at the time, Freud
argued that behavior is driven by unconscious motivations
and drives, rather than rational choice (Luborsky et al., 2008;
Wolitzky, 2011). As discussed by Luborsky et al. (2008), cen-
tral therapeutic strategies of psychoanalysis include free asso-
ciation (expressing any thoughts which come to mind during
therapy), therapeutic listening and responding (examining the
content and emotion of thought), and interpretation (draw-
ing inferences about unconscious underpinnings of conscious
experience).
However, the body also ﬁgures strongly in psychoanalytic the-
ory. For Freud, structures of the mind (e.g., id, ego, superego)
arise out of tensions between the organism’s bodily drives and
societal structures (Muller and Tillman, 2007). This is reﬂected
in the psychoanalytic conception of psychosomatic illness, which
was the idea that emotions and unconscious desires caused bod-
ily symptoms; for example Gregor Groddeck, a psychoanalyst
who developed Freud’s ideas about psychosomatic illness pro-
posed that a tumorous abdominal growth could result from a
warded-off unconscious wish to be pregnant. Furthermore it has
been suggested that the “ego,” in psychoanalysis, commences as
an embodied entity, and emphasizes the continuity between ani-
mals and humans, suggesting a monist, or holistic mind–body
conceptualization (Muller and Tillman, 2007).
BEHAVIOR THERAPY
Traditional behavior therapy arose in an American setting in the
early 1950s and saw a shift from the psychoanalytical ideas of
studying the mind to the pragmatic, evidence-based study of
behavior (Dowd, 2004). This shift was triggered by J. B. Wat-
son’s criticism of subjectivity and mentalism as the subject matter
of psychology and his advocacy of the objective study of behav-
ior. This was followed by the advent of “modern learning theory,”
which referred to the principles of classical and operant condi-
tioning. These early ideas underlying traditional behavior therapy
were exclusivist, rejecting the notion of mind and cognition, on
the grounds that they are unobservable entities and therefore unﬁt
for scientiﬁc study (Wilson, 2008; Zinbarg and Grifﬁth, 2008).
However, later theories stemming from behaviorism devel-
oped a more complex account of the mind–body relationship.
For example, Bandura (1977) spoke of a reciprocal determination
between behavior and the environment, stating that “it is largely
through their actions that people produce the environmental con-
ditions that affect their behavior in a reciprocal fashion” (p. 345).
Bandura also seemed to encourage conceptualization of the mind
as a part of the same system as behavior and environment, for
example, “. . .experiences generated by behavior also partly deter-
mine what individuals think, expect, and can do, which in turn
affects their subsequent behavior” (p. 345).
This holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relation-
ship is also apparent in popular behavior therapies for children
with autism spectrum disorder, such as music therapy, Floor-
time, rhythm therapy, and reciprocal imitation training which
are broadly underpinned by behavioral and functional develop-
mental approaches (Greenspan and Wieder, 1999; Ingersoll and
Schreibman, 2006; Overy, 2008; Vismara and Rogers, 2010; Srini-
vasan and Bhat, 2013). For example, reciprocal imitation training
teaches children the spontaneous social use of imitation, which
as targeted at attention, language and communication cognitions
(Ingersoll and Schreibman, 2006) and Floortime utilizes child-
led playful interactions, experiential problem-solving interactions
and motor, sensory and spatial play, which is targeted at language
and other cognitive skills (Greenspan and Weider, 1997).
COGNITIVE THERAPY
With the advent of the cognitive revolution, pure behavioral ther-
apies begun to fade out in favor of cognitive therapies, which
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followed the prominent model of human functioning at the time;
computational theory (Hayes et al., 1999). Computational the-
ory conceptualized the body as an “input-output device,” or the
“hardware,” and the mind as the“central processor,” the“software,”
or the “controller” (Shapiro, 2007). Due to their concurrent rise,
articulation of the relationship between mind and body in cogni-
tive therapy has been inﬂuenced by this computational perspective
(Dowd, 2004).
Cognitive therapies are deﬁned by their elevation of the cog-
nitive system in the adjustment of information processing and
initiation of positive change (Beck and Weishaar, 2008). This
perspective is fundamental to a family of theories underpin-
ning cognitive therapy, including those of Ellis (1962) and Beck
(1967). Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory remains one of the most
inﬂuential to this day, in particular his major contribution to
cognitive therapy, the cognitive model (Triad) of depression.
This model suggests that depression is underpinned by auto-
matic, negative thoughts about the self, others and the world.
Beck contends that these negative cognitions also activate nega-
tive motivational, behavioral, emotional, and physical symptoms
(Beck and Weishaar, 2008). Thus, for Beck and his contempo-
raries, it is implied that the mind should be the primary target of
psychotherapy.
One of Ellis’ major contributions to cognitive therapy was
the A-B-C method used in his rational emotive behavior ther-
apy (REBT). The A-B-C method challenged the assumption that
when a consequence (C) follows and activating event (A), A
causes C. Ellis posited a cognitive construct, beliefs (B), which
he argued was the greatest determinate of (C). Thus, the idea
was that (C) could be modiﬁed by (B), even if (A) remains
stable (Dowd, 2004; Ellis, 2008). Ellis’ REBT explicitly consid-
ered the importance of content of the “mind” (i.e., thinking,
feeling, wanting etc.), and of operations of the “body” (i.e.,
behavior). However, the relationship between mind and body
was conceptualized in terms of cognitive modiﬁcation to change
behavior or behavior change tomodify thought (Ellis, 2008). Thus,
despite acknowledgment of both mind and body, REBT, akin to
Beck’s cognitive therapy, implies a dualist conception of their
relationship.
MINDFULNESS-BASED PSYCHOTHERAPIES
Recently, there has been an inﬂux of so-called “third wave” psy-
chotherapies which have their roots in learning theory and are
held together by their subordination of content-oriented cogni-
tive interventions (Kahl et al., 2012). One of the key features of
some of these psychotherapies (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy etc.) is their focus
on“mindfulness.”One of the features of mindfulness as applied in
psychological therapies is to develop an awareness of the present
experience by self-regulating attention to momentary sensations,
thoughts, and feelings (Keng et al., 2011). Thus, in contrast to
standard cognitive and behavioral therapies, one of the aims of
mindfulness-based psychotherapies is to increase awareness of the
body.
Awareness is contrasted with “thinking” during mindfulness
exercises such as breathing meditation (Michalak et al., 2012).
Awareness is not about cognition but more about feeling; and the
body is seen as the reference point for awareness. Thus changes
in cognitions (e.g., restricting rumination) following mindfulness
practices are bought about by becoming more aware of the body,
without referring to cognitive dominion (i.e., conscious thought)
to bring about this awareness (Burg and Michalak, 2011). It is
difﬁcult to articulate the relationship between mind and body
implied by mindfulness-based psychotherapies due to two rea-
sons. First, awareness is not conceptualized as a cognitive feature,
but may still be a feature of the “mind.” Second, the body is
not conceptualized as a physical agent of change like behavior
is assumed to inﬂuence cognition in cognitive behavior therapy
(CBT); rather it is awareness of the body which is the agent of
change in mindfulness-based therapies. These questions illustrate
some of the issues which arise when dualistic thinking is reﬂected
upon carefully.
BODY PSYCHOTHERAPY
Body psychotherapy (BP) refers to a variety of schools (e.g.,
dance/movement therapy, analytical body psychotherapy, con-
centrative movement therapy etc.) which share the aim of
enhancing self-awareness, modifying behavior, and facilitating
insight-oriented psychological problem solving via a mode of
action concerning perceptive/self-awareness, affective-cathartic,
interactive, and/or movement oriented therapy (Röhricht, 2009).
Although, there have been randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
conducted for some schools of body psychotherapies, they are
not empirically supported to the same extent that cognitive
and behavioral therapies have been (Röhricht, 2009). In prac-
tice, BP primarily works on releasing and re-shaping somatic
memories in order to release associated psychological constraints
(Totton, 2003). The theoretical foundation for BP has been
explained as the way “core beliefs are embodied, and that until
we begin to experience the pain held in them directly through
our bodies they will continue to run our lives” (Staunton, 2002,
p. 4).
The practice of BP implies a very close relationship between
body and mind, to the point that they are seemingly undifferenti-
ated during therapy. BPhas been described as being fundamentally
underpinned by an explicit theory of mind–body functioning
which assumes a functional unity betweenbody andmind inwhich
there is no separation or hierarchical relationship between the two
(www.eabp.org).
SUMMARY
This brief review exposes a lack of consensus, both implicit
and explicit, regarding the mind–body relationship across psy-
chotherapeutic approaches. Themes arising from this analysis
include a tendency toward dualism (separation of mind and
body from the conceptualization of human functioning), exclu-
sivism (elimination of either mind or body from the con-
ceptualization of human functioning), or mind–body monism
(conceptualization of mind and body as a single, holistic sys-
tem). It is our position that psychotherapeutic research and
practice would beneﬁt from an organizing framework for the
mind–body relationship, which could be applied across all
psychotherapies. Recent research in philosophy (Clark, 1997;
Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), cognitive science (Brooks, 1991;
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Chemero, 2009) and psychology itself (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg
and Robertson, 1999) suggests that this framework should be
underpinned by a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body
relationship.
Embodied cognition offers a psychological framework under-
pinned by a holistic conceptualisation of the mind–body relation-
ship. Some of the abovementioned psychotherapies which have
implied a holistic mind–body perspective have already started
to draw on embodied cognition and related ideas. For exam-
ple, Totton (2009) has recently highlighted the utility of drawing
on embodiment from a social perspective to enhance the prac-
tice of body psychotherapy, while Michalak et al. (2012) has
described how embodied cognition could describe some of the
processes involved in mindfulness. Before describing the psy-
chological framework of embodied cognition, it is important
to brieﬂy examine its philosophical underpinnings which form
the foundation for its conceptualisation of a holistic mind–
body relationship, from both phenomenological and objective
perspectives.
HOLISTIC MIND–BODY PHILOSOPHIES
MERLEAU-PONTY’S LIVED-BODY
Edmund Husserl developed the philosophical approach of phe-
nomenology as a reaction to his concern that the assumptions
of naturalistic, Western science about the nature of the mind,
body, and world had caused it to miss fundamental questions
about human nature (Marcum, 2004). He argued that primary
consideration should be given to the subject’s experience in the
world, before studying the mind, body, and world objectively
(Marcum, 2004; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007). Husserl’s argu-
ment was progressed by Merleau-Ponty, who proposed that this
would both uncover the subjective element of knowledge, which
was being overlooked by naturalistic sciences, and provide a
stronger framework for its enquiries (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007).
Thus, phenomenology does not provide a mechanistic account
of mind in the vein of naturalism, or psychological and biolog-
ical accounts because it focuses on giving a proper description
of humans’ experience in life, rather than attempting to forge an
objective account of mind (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007; Marshall,
2008).
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology argues for the prioritization
of the subjective, lived-body in cognition and more speciﬁcally
that cognitions cannot be understood without reference to the
body which engages with the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1965;
Marshall, 2008). Merleau-Ponty provides a comprehensive theory
of the “lived-body,” or the “subject-body,” contrasting it to the
“thing-body,” or the “object-body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1965;
Marshall, 2008). The subject-body can be considered the body
experienced from a ﬁrst-person perspective which acts on the
world, whereas the object-body can be considered the body as an
object of the world experienced from a third-person perspective.
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the subject-body in cognition, imply-
ing that humans fundamentally are, and thus should be studied
as embodied beings who form cognitions via interaction in the
world with their bodies, rather than cognition as an activity of
the “mind” which utilizes the object-body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
1965; Borrett et al., 2000; Matthews, 2004).
DEWEY’S PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY
In contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach, an
alternative holistic account of the mind–body relationship starts
from an objective position. American pragmatism offers an objec-
tive, philosophical account of a holistic mind and body in the
form of naturalism (Johnson, 2006). As Horst (2002) explicates,
there have been various deﬁnitions and strands of naturalism.
The account we refer to in this section aligns with the Darwinian
paradigm and, more speciﬁcally with physicalism, emergence, and
supervenience (Harbecke, 2013; Montero, 2013; McLaughlin and
Bennett, 2014).
This formof naturalism is committed to an account inwhich all
things in the world, including body and mind are natural or nat-
urally emergent (Horst, 2002; Aikin, 2006). In turn, it posits that
all explanation should be causal and reducible to natural explana-
tions and is consequently committed to the study of the person as
an object and the natural evolution of all human functions (Aikin,
2006; Johnson, 2006). One account of naturalism, from this emer-
gent, supervenient perspective is Dewey’s “principle of continuity”
(Dewey, 1981, 1991).
The principle of continuity posits that there is no break in
experience between the processes of perceiving, feeling, mov-
ing, and thinking; instead they are levels of organic functioning
from which higher function emerges. It describes three levels
of organization: the “physical” level of inanimate material pro-
cesses; the “psycho-physical” level of living things which have
needs, interests, and satisfactions; and the “mental” level of organ-
isms which can perform higher level cognitions. The principle
explains the progression from the physical level to the level of
the mind without introducing new ontological entities, struc-
tures, or forces. Dewey argues that new organization is the
reason that organisms with minds can do things which psycho-
physical entities cannot do, and why psycho-physical entities
can do things which physical entities cannot do. Thus, accord-
ing to Dewey, what we refer to as “mind” is a complex new
organization of what we refer to as “body,” but they are in
essence the same entity. According to the principle of continuity,
what is termed “mind” and “body” are simply ways to iden-
tify aspects of the organism–environment interaction which have
arisen from an organic process (Dewey, 1981, 1991; Johnson, 2006,
2007).
PHENOMENOLOGY AND NATURALISM AS COMPLEMENTARY
APPROACHES
Phenomenology is committed to describing subjective experience,
which is where meaning putatively arises for humans, while nat-
uralism as characterized here provides an objective explanation
of how meaning arises ontogenetically, organically and biologi-
cally, independent of the personal experience of the individual
(Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007; Marshall, 2008). As Aikin (2006, p.
326) puts it “Lovers may love, and pains may pain, but the nat-
uralistic perspective can attend only to the lovers, not their love;
to the pains, but not their feelings of pain.” Similarly, the phe-
nomenological perspective can attend only to the love, not the
lovers and to the feelings of pain rather than the pains. Thus,
phenomenologists can provide to naturalists, psychologists and
neuroscientists a more precise model of the phenomenon which
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they attempt to explain than they would if they were to start only
with an “objective” scientiﬁc theory of cognition (Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2007). Thus, phenomenology and naturalism are con-
trasting, but complementary approaches (Aikin, 2006; Zahavi,
2010).
Accordingly, the different directions from which Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of continuity
approach the question of the relationship between mind and body
are complementary, providing ultimately a more comprehensive,
pluralistic understanding of the holistic mind–body relation-
ship. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account can inform
Dewey’s objective account of how a person experiences the holistic
mind–body described in his theory.
Thus, a philosophical integration of these perspectives may be
possible (Zahavi, 2010), but our aim here is to provide a frame-
work for psychotherapeutic research and practice. Therefore, it
is necessary to provide a psychological account which integrates
subjective and objective perspectives of a holistic mind–body rela-
tionship. We propose that grounded cognition provides such a
framework.
GROUNDED COGNITION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORK REFLECTING A HOLISTIC MIND–BODY
RELATIONSHIP
Embodied cognition is a research program consisting of a num-
ber of accounts and topics, held together by the underlying
assumption that the body functions as a constituent of the mind
rather than a perceiver and actor serving the mind, thus being
directly, and subjectively involved in cognition (Borrett et al.,
2000; Shapiro, 2007). Different accounts of embodied cogni-
tion provide various models of this underlying assumption, so
it is useful to focus on one to explore the holistic conceptual-
ization of body and mind and how it aligns with the principles
of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of
continuity.
“Grounded cognition” reﬂects the underlying embodied cogni-
tion assumption by proposing that cognition is derived from, and
dependent on, bodily interactions with the world which are rep-
resented in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). Grounded cognition has
been comprehensively articulated and critiqued in the literature
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008), has a strong empirical foundation (e.g.,
Schubert,2005; Chandler andSchwarz,2009; Jostmannet al.,2009;
Natanzon and Ferguson, 2012 etc.) and most importantly, clearly
explicates the holistic relationship of body andmind, aligningwith
both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Dewey’s principle of
continuity as considered next.
Grounded cognition is underpinned by two major assump-
tions, namely that cognition is dependent on the body’s interaction
with the world and that these interactions are represented in
the brain (Barsalou, 2008). Grounded cognition’s ﬁrst assump-
tion is illustrated neatly by Shapiro (2011) in considering the
concept of a morel mushroom for Sally, a mycologist, Charles,
a provencal chef, and Lucy, a young child. Sally conceptual-
izes a morel as an epigenous ascocarp, Charles conceptualizes a
morel as a delicacy to be sautéed with butter, and Lucy concep-
tualizes a morel as the yucky thing she has to eat before being
allowed dessert. Thus, each according to their bodily experiences
with morels forms different conceptualizations of it. However,
these concepts are not determinate: for example, if Lucy grows
up to become a mycologist, her concept of a morel would be
more similar to Sally’s. Furthermore, it is important to note
that there is nothing stopping Sally, Charles, and Lucy from
having the same concept for a morel, it is simply their differ-
ing bodily interactions with the morel which has determined
their conceptualizations. Finally, it can be assumed that they
have the same visual conceptualization of a morel; they all know
one when they see it. However, if Lucy were to have been born
blind, she would never be able to obtain the same concept of
a morel as Sally and Charles. Thus, grounded cognition aligns
with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology by emphasizing the impor-
tance of subjective body-in-the-world experience for cognition
(Johnson, 2006).
The second major assumption of grounded cognition is that
the body’s relationship with the world is represented in the brain
(Barsalou, 2008). Theories within grounded cognition differ on
how these bodily interactions are represented in the brain, with
some theories positing “image schemas” of bodily interactions in
the world which are proposed to underpin abstract conceptual
knowledge (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). However, most grounded
cognition theories propose “simulations,” which are neural recon-
structions of experience using representations contained in modal
systems of the brain (Glenberg, 1997; e.g., the sensorimotor sys-
tem; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Thus grounded
cognition is also consistent with Dewey’s principle of continuity
in that from an objective, neuroscientiﬁc perspective, cogni-
tions are emergent from, and inextricably intertwined with the
body.
In sum, grounded cognition implies that cognition is emer-
gent from and inextricably tied to the subjective, lived, experience
of the body-in-the-world. Thus, “mind” and “body” only func-
tion as labels attached to properties of human functioning which
we perceive as originating either mentally or physically. Con-
ceiving of the relationship between body and mind from this
holistic, psychological perspective can be expected to have a
number of important implications for psychotherapy theory and
practice.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY THEORY AND
PRACTICE
First, a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body relation-
ship leads to a better understanding of the tensions between
psychotherapy theory and practice. When the mind–body rela-
tionship is conceptualized from a dualist or exclusivist perspective,
a tension is created between the phenomenological needs of the
patient who is present mind and body and the emphasis on
either mind or body according to the theoretical assumptions
of the psychotherapy practiced by the therapist. One exam-
ple of this is the de-emphasis of the body during the practice
of psychotherapies whose underlying theory disembodies the
mind. During such therapies (e.g., cognitive therapy), touch is
purposefully excluded from therapeutic practice since the mind
is conceptualized as the agent of change, even though thera-
peutic practice could possibly be enhanced by touch (Feltham,
2008).
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Second, a psychologically articulated, holistic framework for
the mind–body relationship encourages theoretical reﬂection
about this relationship by challenging dualist and exclusivist
assumptions inherent in some psychotherapies. In turn, this helps
to clarify some of the points of difference between the psychother-
apies described above. Numerous psychotherapies discussed in
“Mind–Body Assumptions Underlying Current Psychotherapies,”
have similar theoretical background and similar therapeutic prac-
tices. An example of this is traditional behavioral therapy and
body psychotherapy. Both emphasize the body and conceptualize
it as the agent of change and as a consequence, both prioritize
the body in therapy. One of the primary differences between
the two can be ascertained by reﬂecting on the mind–body rela-
tionship. Traditional behavior therapy is very much exclusivist,
dismissing the mind and cognition and emphasizing the body and
behavior, both methodologically and theoretically. Contrastingly,
body psychotherapy recognizes cognitionswhilst treating themvia
the body, thus implying a holistic conceptualization of mind and
body.
Third, a holistic conceptualization of the mind–body rela-
tionship has the potential to further de-stigmatize mental illness
(Thomas, 2013; Ungar and Knaak, 2013a,b). Ungar and Knaak
(2013a) suggest that dismissive and blaming attitudes toward
mental health issues can be attributed to the absence of an
organic explanation for most mental health issues. Thomas
(2013) suggests that promoting mental illness to non-psychiatric
health professionals as an interaction between cognitive, behav-
ioral, emotional, biological, and environmental factors would
reduce dualistic thinking around mental health issues and help
with de-stigmatization in these settings. The psychologically
articulated, holistic conceptualization of the mind–body rela-
tionship presented here elaborates on Thomas’ idea by con-
ceptualizing cognitive, behavioral, emotional, biological, and
environmental factors as part of the same functional system,
implying that “organic” causes are inseparable from “mental”
causes. Thus, we propose that the holistic conceptualization
of the mind–body relationship presented here will further help
with de-stigmatization of mental illness in non-psychiatric set-
tings.
Fourth, the clearly articulated, explicit position of a holis-
tic mind–body portrayed by grounded cognition encourages a
more reﬂective approach to the issue in practice. Theories under-
lying most current psychotherapies do not explicitly state their
position regarding the relationship between mind and body.
Consequently, practitioners unreﬂectively adopt the assumptions
inherent in the psychotherapies they utilize. The clear articula-
tion of a holistic mind–body from both phenomenological and
objective perspectives may assist practitioners to reﬂect on this
relationship. For example, from a grounded cognition perspec-
tive “mind” and “body” are only labels attached to properties
of human functioning which we perceive as originating either
mentally or physically. The issue for psychotherapy practice
is that in using these labels with patients, they automatically
divide psychopathologies into arbitrary categories and thus por-
tray dualist or exclusivist agendas. This then restricts the patient’s
conceptualization of what the psychopathology is and how to
manage it. A grounded cognition perspective would encourage
a broader language around psychopathologies as disorders of
the “system,” whether the symptoms are perceived as mental or
physical. This will encourage the patient to focus on the holis-
tic nature of their symptoms during treatment, as opposed to
the idea that some treatments are behavioral/bodily and oth-
ers are mind/cognitive. This is but one example of changes
which may come of reﬂecting on the mind–body relationship in
practice.
Finally, a new perspective on the mind–body relationship will
guide the identiﬁcation of gaps in existing therapies and conse-
quently promote an expansion of the range of therapies offered to
the patient. For example, grounded cognition implies that one way
to change cognitions is through the subjective, lived, bodily expe-
rience of the individual. Encouraging practitioners to reﬂect on a
holistic mind–body approach may result in a wider range of thera-
pies they can offer their patients stemming from this idea. Further
development of these ideas may also result in the creation of new
and innovative therapeutic methods to augment those already in
existence.
CONCLUSION
Psychological science sits awkwardly between mind and body,
and its application in psychotherapy inherits this awkwardness
in a lack of clarity about how therapists should conceptualize
their patients. By reviewing how mind and body are tradition-
ally understood in major psychotherapies, we have attempted to
underscore some of the tensions in this area. By introducing and
outlining grounded cognition as a holistic psychological approach
consistent with both radically subjectivist (Merleau-Ponty) and
objectivist (Dewey) philosophical approaches, we hope to have
proposed a new way forward for theorists and practitioners of psy-
chotherapy. This new way forward throws light on the relationship
between existing psychotherapies, the relationship between theory
and practice, and highlights opportunities for new approaches to
psychotherapy.
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